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# Methodological Problems in Cognitive Psychology

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# (At Least) Three Ways Bayes Nets Can Matter for Cognitive Psych

1. Novel theoretical possibilities
  2. More detailed specification of the experiments being performed
  3. Novel experimental designs
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
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# Novel Theories

- Causal learning community has focused on simple parameter estimation
    - Given a series of cases, people must rate the “causal strength”
    - Leads to relatively simple psychological theories
    - There are often multiple plausible theories that can fit a particular dataset
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# Novel Theories

- More specifically, causal learning is just parameter estimation for the graph:



- Absence of causation is just  $\alpha_i = 0$

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# Novel Theories

- Using Bayes nets suggests novel theories that have not previously been considered in the causal learning community
    - Specifically, consider the possibility that people are also learning structure, not just parameters
  - This shift leads to theories such as:
    - Bayesian updating over structures (Tenenbaum)
    - Using interventions to learn structure (Gopnik)
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# Clarifying Experiments

- Typical causal learning experiments just specify the probability distribution over the causes and effect
  - This formulation can obscure the causal structure to be learned
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# Clarifying Experiments


- Instead, we can use a Bayes net to specify the causal structure (and then make sure the probability distribution fits the graph)

## Advantages:

1. Can easily determine whether two experiments are qualitatively different
  2. Can better determine the range of situations tested in experiments
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# Clarifying Experiments

- For example, we find that almost all two-cause experiments used one of these two causal structures:





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# Novel Experiments

- Typical experimental design:
    - Pre-define the causes and effect to fit the probability distribution
    - Provide either a series (or summary) of observations of cases with values for the (earlier defined) causes/effect
    - Ask people to provide a rating of “causal strength”
    - Provide no feedback to the subject until the end of the experiment
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# Novel Experiments

- Using Bayes nets suggests changes to these features of the experimental design:
    - “Pre-define the causes and effect to fit the probability distribution” →  
Determine the influence of these definitions by using the same probability distribution with different tags for the variables (Waldmann)
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# Novel Experiments

- Using Bayes nets suggests changes to these features of the experimental design:
    - “Provide either a series (or summary) of observations of cases with values for the (earlier defined) causes/effect” →  
Allow the subject (or the experimenter) to intervene on the variables, rather than simply watching them (Gopnik)
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# Novel Experiments

- Using Bayes nets suggests changes to these features of the experimental design:
    - “Ask people to provide a rating of ‘causal strength’” →  
Have people choose among graphs that represent causal structure (Steyvers); or  
Have people make a forced choice about whether “ $X$  causes  $Y$ ” (Danks)
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# Novel Experiments

- Using Bayes nets suggests changes to these features of the experimental design:
  - “Provide no feedback to the subject until the end of the experiment” →  
Allow the subjects to see the results of their interventions (Gopnik)



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# Other Applications?

- Use of regression (e.g., in social psychology)  
Use of latent variable analyses (e.g., PCA)
    - Bayes net search methods are reliable in more contexts than these two methods – how should they be used in practice?
  - Application of psychological research
    - Can we use Bayes nets to model the effects of policies (social and personal) based on psychological research?
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# Other Applications?

- Decision theory that incorporates causation
    - In the standard theory, decisions are made without using causal structure. Actions look like interventions – can Bayes nets inform theories and experiments of decision-making?
  - Theory/belief change in children
    - Can this process be modeled using Bayes nets? Are novel experiments suggested by that framework?
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# Constraint-Based & Bayesian Learning

- Bayesian learning – it's what Chris talked about this morning
    - Establish a probability distribution over graphs (& a distribution over parameters for each graph)
    - Update the distributions based on the observed data using Bayes' Theorem
    - In practice, usually approximated using some type of greedy search algorithm
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
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# Constraint-Based & Bayesian Learning

- Constraint-based learning:
    - Examine one's data to determine the independencies and associations in that data
    - Determine the set of graphs that could possibly have produced data with that pattern
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# Constraint-Based & Bayesian Learning

- Example of constraint-based learning:



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# Intervention vs. Observation

- We all agree that causal information is useful because it enables us to predict the outcomes of our interventions
  - So for Bayes nets to be good models of causation, they must be good models of the effects of interventions
  - How do they do that?
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# Intervention vs. Observation

- To model an intervention in a Bayes net, you simply remove all edges into the “intervened-upon” variable, and leave all other edges intact
  - Thus, to determine whether an intervention on  $X$  changes  $Y$ , you just change the graph according to the above rule, and then see whether there is a path from  $X$  to  $Y$   
*(note: not exactly right, but close enough)*
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
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# Intervention vs. Observation

- Consider the simplest case of causation:  
*Light Switch* → *Light Bulb*
  - An intervention on *Light Switch* doesn't change the graph at all (since there are no edges into *Light Switch*), and so that intervention **will** matter for *Light Bulb*
  - On the other hand, intervening on *Light Bulb* does change the graph (removing the edge), and so the intervention **doesn't** matter for *LS*
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
# Intervention vs. Observation

- A large (abstract) causal structure:



# Intervention vs. Observation


- A large (abstract) causal structure:






# Intervention vs. Observation

- A large (abstract) causal structure:



# Intervention vs. Observation

- A large (abstract) causal structure:



- The intervention on  $D$  affects only  $F$ !